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The Supreme Court in the American Constitutional System
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
David F. Maxwell*
It is a rare privilege for me to participate with such distin-
guished and erudite educators in discussing so fundamental and
timely a subject as the role of the Supreme Court in the American
Constitutional System. I do not profess to be an expert on con-
stitutional law but as an active practicing attorney serving on
the periphery of its axis, I am vitally interested in preserving its
integrity as an institution of our republican form of government.
It is my fervent hope that what is said here today will promote
that objective.
The average American is a blunt, outspoken individual. If
he does not like the way the government is conducting its affairs,
he says so. That is his privilege guaranteed by our Constitution
- a precious right which is the sine qua non of a democracy.
It is therefore inevitable that the Supreme Court should
receive its fair share of Joe Citizen's attentions. The issues upon
which the Court passes are the serious concern of all Americans
and its decisions have implications which are too far-reaching to
be ignored.
Indeed, from the time of its creation the Court has never been
regarded by the people as sacrosanct, and the mythical ivory
tower in which its justices are presumed to be isolated has fre-
quently been turned into a goldfish bowl. As early as 1793 the
Court was subjected to a blistering attack by reason of its
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia1 wherein it sustained the right
of the federal judiciary to summon a state as defendant in a suit
by a citizen of another state.
* President, The American Bar Foundation. Partner in the firm of Obermayer,
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1 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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People today view Senator Jenner's proposal to whittle down
the Court's jurisdiction with alarm, and yet, that is exactly what
the Congress of that day did when by the 11 th Constitutional
Amendment, ratified by the requisite number of states in 1798,
they deprived the Court of the jurisdiction to determine suits
instituted against one state by the citizen of another state or of
a foreign government.
So down through the years the judgments of the Court have
aroused public clamor, oftentimes deep resentment. The attacks
against it have taken the form of urging impeachment of its
judges, diluting of its jurisdiction, changing the method of
selecting its members, and increasing its number. (In 1869,
Congress increased the Court to 9).
But the state of the nation until recently was such that there
was never more than one great overriding issue at any given
time. The Court of John Marshall was concerned primarily with
establishing the Court's position in the constitutional system;
under Chief Justice Roger Taney, the states' rights theory of
President Jackson absorbed the attention of the Court culmin-
ating in 1857 with its decision in the Dred Scott case.2 The
reconstruction days following the Civil War saw the issue of
civil liberties rise to prominence on the Court's docket, featuring
the case of Ex Parte Milligan3 branded by Thad Stevens as
"more dangerous" than that of the Dred Scott case.
But I must not usurp the province of those who are to follow
me by reciting at length the history of the Court. Suffice it to
say that generally the pattern continued the same through the
latter part of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th
century with the controversy over the Court revolving around
a particular issue on which the country was fairly divided.
This history is in sharp contrast with the situation confront-
ing the Court today under Chief Justice Earl Warren. The
United States today has suddenly been thrust into a new role.
Whereas formerly we were concerned with problems which
were parochial in nature, our assumption of the leadership of
the free world has caused vast changes, not only with respect to
our relations to other nations, but internally as well. No longer
does the Supreme Court treat one or two major issues. The
nature of our society is such that within a single term the Court
is required to render decisions which have cut across political
2 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
3 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
[Vol. XXXIII
SUPREME COURT SYMPOSIUM
party lines and sectional boundaries. They have had a far-reach-
ing impact upon powerful business and professional interests.
They have covered a wide variety of subjects, touching emotion-
ally and economically upon millions of our citizens.
It is not surprising that a storm of protest from all over the
country has followed in the wake of the decisions restricting the
operations of the F.B.I., the rights of bar associations to pass
upon qualifications of attorneys, and the rights of school boards
to discharge teachers. It is not surprising that the DuPont case
4
extending the application of the Clayton Act to vertical com-
binations created a furor in business circles, or that the segrega-
tion cases aroused strong feelings in the South. The case of
the west coast communists reversing their convictions under the
Smith Act 5 could not help but excite those who are dedicated
to preventing the expansion of communist influence in this
country. The antagonistic reaction of Congress to the Watkins6
case restricting the use of its contempt remedy was certainly
to be anticipated.
Collectively, these various cases, having been decided within
a relatively short period, were bound to cause public agitation.
This agitation has taken varied forms. It has ranged from pro-
posals in certain Southern States for revival of the Calhoun
doctrine of nullification to the introduction in this last session
of the Congress of the Jenner Bill7 which would deprive the
Supreme Court of the jurisdiction to hear appeals in five classes
of cases involving communism.
Criticism of the decisions of the Court is healthy. Indeed our
whole system of separate opinions is based upon the fact that
unanimity is not required. But there is a difference between the
sound criticism of the work of the Court and the nonsense re-
ported in the "SPX Research Associates" document submitted
at the hearings of the Internal Securities Committee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee which charges the Court With fol-
lowing the communist line and rendering aid and comfort to
our enemy."
With the eyes of the public thus focused at the moment on
the Court, it behooves the bar of the nation to stand steadfast
in its defense. Lawyers are best fitted by training and experience
4 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1956).
5 70 STAT. 623 (1956), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (Supp. 1957).
6 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
7 S. 2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
8 SPX Research Associates.
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to appreciate the necessity for the Court as a balance wheel in
our scheme of government. It should not, to them at least, be
any more unusual for as few as four justices to have in their
hands the balance of power under certain circumstances than
it is for a strong executive to control the destinies of our people
or for a few outstanding leaders in the Congress to shape up
legislation having a far-reaching influence on their lives and
fortunes. It was after all the bar of the nation which in 1937,
arising almost to a man, fought courageously and successfully
to prevent the enactment of the court-packing legislation spon-
sored by the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Now that the
pendulum has swung in the other direction, it is equally as
essential that they unite in defending the Court as an institution.
By a resolution adopted at its recent midwinter meeting the
American Bar Association has done just that, as Dr. Elliott
will point out more in detail in a later paper. I call upon the
lawyers of America to rally to the Association's banner in this
cause.
The Court has withstood public criticism in the past and
I am confident that despite the fears and pressures of the mo-
ment, which too often are expressed in unfortunate legislative
proposals, it will withstand the furor now. In a country which is
undergoing violent change because of internal and external
factors, the Court is perhaps the most stable of our American
heritages. The essence of the genius of our Constitutional System
is its flexibility and adaptability to change within its own frame-
work. When the final count is taken by future generations re-
flecting upon the work of this Court, I think they will find that
the constitutional law structure has not been altered so violently
as the critics would have us believe. Rather, its decisions will
prove to have been an adaption of the charter under which we
operate to the conditions of our time without having uprooted
the basic concepts of our national judicial system.
To paraphrase Professor Alfred North Whitehead, the eminent
philosopher - as the key to any science of values is found in
aesthetics, so the Supreme Court can best be defined as seeking
the aesthetic satisfaction of bringing the Constitution into harm-
ony with the activities of modern America.
And now to our distinguished panel I will leave the burden
of completing in color and detail the painting of the Supreme
Court which I have but barely outlined with broad brush-strokes.
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